Real and Accrual‐Based Earnings Management in the Pre‐ and Post‐IFRS Periods: Evidence from China by Ho, Li‐chin Jennifer et al.
Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management
in the Pre- and Post-IFRS Periods: Evidence
from China
Li-Chin Jennifer Ho
Department of Accounting, College of Business, University of Texas at Arlington,
Arlington, TX 76019-0468
e-mail: lichinho@uta.edu
Qunfeng Liao
School of Management, University of Michigan at Flint, Flint, MI 48502-1950,
e-mail: qunliao@umflint.edu
Martin Taylor
Department of Accounting, College of Business, University of Texas at Arlington,
Arlington, TX 76019-0468
e-mail: mtaylor@uta.edu
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate the prevalence of both accrual- and activi-
ties-based earnings management for Chinese A-share firms surrounding the adoption
of substantially IFRS-convergent accounting standards. Since 2007, all listed A-share
firms in China have been required to comply with a new set of accounting standards
that have substantially conformed to IFRS. The new reform also produced a set of
new auditing standards and internal control reporting requirements. Based on a sam-
ple of 4,050 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2011, we find that Chinese firms in
the post-IFRS period (2007–2011) are less likely to engage in accrual-based earnings
management. The magnitude of discretionary accruals also declines after IFRS adop-
tion. In response, we see firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute
for upward earnings management. The reduction in accrual-based earnings manage-
ment could stem from higher quality accounting standards associated with IFRS
adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes introduced with the
IFRS mandate. A further analysis, however, indicates that the benefits of IFRS adop-
tion in curbing upward accrual-based earnings manipulation are not evenly distributed
across firms. Specifically, the benefit diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chi-
nese central or local governments, are located in less developed regions, and that have
weak financial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find that
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the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non-manufactur-
ing counterparts.
1. Introduction
Beginning in 1992, China implemented a series of accounting regula-
tions with the goal of improving the quality of publicly available finan-
cial statements. The most recent reform occurred in 2006, which
requires that, effective in January 2007, all listed A-share firms follow
a new set of accounting standards that have substantially conformed
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The new
reform also produced 48 new Chinese Auditing Standards that are sim-
ilar to the international auditing standards issued by the International
Auditing and Assurance Standard Board. In addition, a set of new
internal control standards were issued in June 2008, which requires
Chinese firms that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges to perform systematic evaluations of their internal control
systems and issue reports on an annual basis.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in earnings
management behavior for Chinese A-share firms surrounding the
adoption of substantially IFRS-convergent accounting standards. Our
primary motivation for conducting this analysis is threefold. First, we
intend to provide further evidence on the intended and unintended
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. We use a single-country
setting because such design helps us better understand and control
contemporaneous non-IFRS effects and therefore increases the internal
validity of results (see Barth et al., 2008; Br€uggemann et al., 2013). We
focus on China because, as the largest and fastest growing emerging
market as well as the second largest world economy, China is
increasingly important to investors and other market participants
around the globe. Understanding the effects of IFRS adoption in
China is particularly interesting given its unique economic, political,
and institutional differences that distinguish it from well-developed
countries (Liu et al., 2011).
Second, we choose to focus on earnings management issue when
examining the effect of IFRS on financial reporting quality because (1)
earnings quality is a fundamental characteristic of the financial report-
ing process and (2) the extent of earnings management has been a
common measure of earnings quality. Managerial propensity to man-
age earnings is a common business phenomenon in a U.S. setting (e.g.,
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Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Graham et al., 2005). The prevalence of
earnings management in China has also been well documented in
extant studies (e.g., Aharony et al., 2000; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Jian
and Wong, 2010). In addition, existing literature shows that earnings
management can be achieved through various forms. One common
way is to use accounting estimates and judgments to affect accruals,
which is known as accrual-based earnings management. An alternative
way is referred to as “real” earnings management where managers
engage in real activities such as reducing research and development
(R&D) and advertising expenditures to improve earnings performance
(e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006).
Third, prior research points to a substitutive relation between real and
accrual-based earnings management (e.g., Zang, 2012). Studies by Ewert
and Wagenhofer (2005) as well as Cohen et al. (2008) further suggest
that more rigorous accounting standards and/or stricter reporting
regimes could motivate firms to substitute accrual-based with real earn-
ings management. To the extent that IFRS adoption could lead to
changes in the quality of accounting standards and/or the strength of
regulatory frameworks in China, we may observe some changes in earn-
ings management behavior surrounding China’s 2007 IFRS adoption.
Based on a sample of 4,050 firm-year observations from 2002 to
2011, we find that Chinese firms in the post-IFRS period (2007–2011)
are less likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management but are
more likely to engage in real earnings management. This evidence is
consistent with the view that managers in Chinese firms turn to real
earnings management as a substitute mechanism to achieve earnings
benchmarks when their ability to manipulate accruals upward is con-
strained after IFRS adoption. The reduction in accrual-based earnings
management could stem from higher quality accounting standards
associated with IFRS adoption and/or concurrent changes in the gov-
ernance regimes (i.e., the audit reform and internal control reporting
requirements) introduced with the IFRS mandate.
Prior studies indicate that firms’ reporting incentives play a crucial
role for reporting outcomes (e.g., Ball et al., 2003). In our second set
of empirical tests, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the
results documented for the overall sample using a set of institutional
factors in China that have been identified to have influences on firms’
reporting incentives. These factors include firms’ ownership structure,
listing status, regional development, industry membership, and degree
of marketization. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the benefits
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of IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual-based earnings manipula-
tion are not evenly distributed across firms. In particular, we find that
the benefit diminishes for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). To the
extent that SOEs receive more government support and rely less on
external capital, this evidence is consistent with the view that SOEs
may not have strong incentives to be more transparent and therefore
the effectiveness of IFRS adoption on constraining accrual-based earn-
ings management is quite limited for SOEs. We also find that the bene-
fit occurs only for firms that are located in provinces with a higher
degree of market development, which is in line with the previous
research findings that the degree of similarity of economic, legal, and
social environments to developed countries could affect the effective-
ness and relevance of IFRS adoption in emerging markets. In addition,
for the set of underperforming firms with delisting concerns (firms that
report losses for two consecutive years), there is no evidence that the
extent of upward accrual-based earnings management declines in the
post-IFRS period. This evidence is consistent with the argument that
the use of bright-line earnings thresholds to determine whether a firm
can remain listed in China provides strong incentives for underper-
forming firms to engage in upward earnings management. Finally, we
find that the decline in the extent of accrual-based earnings manage-
ment is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for their non-
manufacturing counterparts. One possible explanation is that the
greater competition among firms in the manufacturing sector increases
earnings management incentives of such firms and therefore the benefit
of IFRS adoption is not so obvious. Consistent with prior literature,
the results of cross-sectional analyses underscore the importance of
firms’ reporting incentives to assess the effectiveness of IFRS adoption
on financial reporting quality.
Although the focus of this study is on the changes in earnings man-
agement surrounding IFRS adoption, we also examine the capital mar-
ket effects of China’s IFRS adoption. Two sets of findings are
documented. First, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value, we find
that Chinese A-share firms exhibit a significant increase in firm value
in the post-IFRS period. Second, we find that the market perception
of the usefulness of accounting numbers has improved in the post-
IFRS period. Specifically, our evidence indicates that investors place
more weight on the earnings information in firm valuation in the post-
IFRS period. We have some evidence that book value of equity and
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cash flows from operations become more value relevant; however, the
evidence is much weaker relative to that of earnings.
Our study is closely related to one of prior studies that examine the
association between IFRS adoption and financial reporting quality in
China. Similar to Liu et al. (2011), our study provides evidence regarding
the effect of IFRS adoption on the accounting quality of Chinese firms.
Our study, however, extends theirs in three important ways. First, Liu
et al. (2011) only cover two pre- (2005–2006) and two post-adoption
years (i.e., 2007–2008) in their analysis. Br€uggemann et al. (2013) argue
that using short analysis periods is one weakness of current IFRS studies
and therefore call for a re-examination of potential IFRS effects using a
longer time series. As a response to their call, our study employs a longer
test period (5 years before and 5 years after the IFRS adoption) to
enhance the power of the tests and improve the validity of the results.
Second, Liu et al. (2011) report the overall impact of 2007 IFRS adop-
tion in China, while our study incorporates a cross-sectional analysis in
an attempt to shed light on how the unique institutional factors in China
could drive the reporting and other capital market effects of IFRS adop-
tion. Third, by examining the two alternative methods of managing earn-
ings upward, our study shows although the adoption of IFRS reduces
the probability and extent of accrual-based earnings management for
certain Chinese firms (intended consequences), the overall propensity
and magnitude of real activities manipulation in China increase after
IFRS adoption (unintended consequences). To our knowledge, this
study is the first to document the substitution effect in Chinese market.
Our study also contributes to accounting literature in the following
ways. To the extent that local GAAP in China prior to IFRS convergence
are largely rules based and IFRS are more principles based, our findings
shed light on the debate regarding the merits and drawbacks of princi-
ples- versus rules-based system and therefore may have practical implica-
tions for policy makers and standard setters. In addition, our findings
that the effects of China’s IFRS adoption are conditional on provincial-
level institutional environments and firm-level factors such as state own-
ership and listing status highlight the importance of firms’ reporting
incentives to determine the effectiveness of accounting standards.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3
discusses the research methodology. Section 4 describes data and sam-
ple. Results are presented in section 5, and conclusions are in the final
section.
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2. Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1. IFRS and Financial Reporting Quality
There are arguments supporting a positive association between IFRS
adoption and financial reporting quality. First, the more comprehen-
sive disclosure requirements under IFRS relative to most domestic
accounting standards could make the financial reporting process more
transparent (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006; Ding et al., 2007; Daske
et al., 2008). Second, by tightening accounting choices and reducing
the amount of reporting discretion, IFRS can limit opportunistic earn-
ings management and therefore improve accounting quality (Ashbaugh
and Pincus, 2001; Barth et al., 2008).
Another set of arguments in favor of a positive association between
IFRS adoption and financial reporting quality centers on the merits and
drawbacks of principles- versus rules-based accounting standards. Pro-
ponents of principles-based standards have argued that such an account-
ing system focuses on the substance rather than form of the transactions.
No matter how complex the transactions are, the accounting methods
used and financial results reported by managers still have to reflect the
economic substance of those transactions. Therefore, managers may find
principles-based accounting standards more difficult to circumvent and
they are unlikely to structure transactions for a window-dressing purpose
(see e.g., AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee 2003; SEC
2003). In addition, under the principles-based approach, managers are
given more flexibility to choose the accounting methods that better
reflect firms’ underlying activities, which in turn could improve the infor-
mativeness/relevance of accounting numbers and therefore financial
reporting quality (Schipper, 2003). To the extent that local GAAP in
many countries (including China) are largely rules based and IFRS are
more principles based, the above arguments support the view that IFRS
adoption should have a positive impact on financial reporting quality.
There are also arguments that, even if the quality of accounting
standards per se does not improve, it is still possible that financial
reporting quality increases because of changes in the institutional
structures contemporaneous with firms’ adoption of IFRS (Barth
et al., 2008). Many countries (including China) engage in auditing and
other governance reforms or strengthen their enforcement mechanisms
along with the mandatory IFRS adoption. Such institutional changes
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could lead to higher accounting quality due to their impacts on man-
agers’ reporting incentives (Daske et al., 2008).
However, there are also some reasons to be suspicious of the pre-
mise that IFRS reporting is associated with higher accounting quality.
Opponents of IFRS often argue that principles-based standards are
less specific and therefore require managers and auditors to exercise
more judgment when applying the standards. The heavy reliance on
judgment could not only reduce the consistency and comparability of
financial information, but also create more opportunities for managers
to manipulate accounting numbers (FASB 2002; Barth et al., 2008).
Yet another factor that affects the effectiveness of IFRS on account-
ing quality is the interplay between accounting standards and manag-
ers’ reporting incentives. As indicated by Ball et al. (2003), higher
quality accounting standards alone do not necessarily lead to higher
financial reporting quality. It is the interplay between accounting stan-
dards and managers’ reporting incentives that largely determines the
effectiveness of accounting standards. Reporting incentives, in turn,
depend on the economic, legal, and political factors that shape up the
institutional environment.1
Prior empirical evidence on the effects of IFRS adoption on finan-
cial reporting quality is also mixed. On one hand, many studies (Leuz
et al., 2003; Bartov et al., 2005; Barth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010)
document that the quality of IFRS is higher than that of domestic
accounting standards. For example, Barth et al. (2008) show that firms
applying International Accounting Standards (IAS) have higher
accounting quality than firms that do not from 1994 through 2003.
Specifically, IAS firms exhibit less earnings management, more timely
loss recognition, and higher value relevance. Chen et al. (2010) indicate
that firms in the European Union countries are associated with lower
earnings management and higher accruals quality after the 2005
mandatory adoption of IFRS.
As a related study, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) show that IFRS
convergence improves analyst forecast accuracy. Daske et al. (2008)
examine the capital market effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in 26
countries around the world. They find an increase in market liquidity
and equity valuation as well as a decrease in cost of capital after IFRS
adoption.
However, there is also evidence in prior studies that points to a lim-
ited role of IFRS adoption in affecting financial reporting quality and/
or producing capital market effects. For example, although Daske
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et al. (2008) show positive market effects with IFRS adoption in terms
of higher market liquidity and lower cost of capital, they also point
out that the positive effects occur only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where enforcement mechanisms are
strong. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) examine whether volun-
tary adoption of IFRS reduces earnings management using a set of
firms in Germany, a country with relatively weaker investor protection
rights. They find no significant differences in earnings management
behavior between firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS and those
reporting under German GAAP. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) also
fail to find that IFRS-based earnings and book values are associated
with higher value relevance for German firms. Paananen and Lin
(2009) even document a decrease in accounting quality after IFRS
adoption in Germany for the period 2000 through 2006.
2.2. Real versus Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Our study is also motivated by the recent literature that documents a
substitutive relation between real and accrual-based earnings manage-
ment. Zang (2012) documents that managers trade off the two earnings
management mechanisms based on their relative costs. Specifically, she
finds that firms with less accounting flexibility due to excessive accrual
manipulation in prior years or shorter operating cycles tend to use real
earnings management to a greater extent. On the other hand, firms use
more accrual-based earnings management when they are (1) less com-
petitive in the industry, (2) in lower financial health status, (3) subject
to higher monitoring from institutional investors, and (4) associated
with greater tax expenses. The substitutive relation is further evidenced
by the sequential nature of two activities; that is, managers adjust the
level of accrual-based management at the fiscal year-end according to
the level of real activities manipulation realized during the year.
Cohen et al. (2008) document that managers have shifted away from
accrual-based to real earnings management after the passage of SOX,
consistent with managers changing their earnings management tactics
in response to the increase in litigation risk and outside scrutiny in the
post-SOX era. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine firms’ tendency to
trade off real versus accrual-based earnings management around sea-
soned equity offerings and show that the likelihood of engaging in real
earnings management is positively associated with the following fac-
tors: the presence of a Big 8 auditor, longer auditor tenure, being in a
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litigious industry, and the level of operating assets (as a proxy for the
firm’s accounting flexibility).
As a related study, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) analyze the rela-
tion between the tightness of accounting standards and the level of
earnings management using a rational expectations equilibrium model.
Although their theoretical models predict that tighter accounting stan-
dards will increase earnings quality as measured by the variability of
reported earnings and value relevance, they show the circumstances
where real earnings management will increase with tighter accounting
standards due to a substitution effect.
2.3. China’s Accounting Reform
After experiencing a sustained period of economic reform over the last
thirty years, China has become more similar to developed countries in
terms of economic and social conditions (Liu et al., 2011). The transi-
tion has resulted in a much larger private sector and capital market,
which places a stronger demand for higher quality accounting standards.
Beginning in 1992, China implemented a series of accounting regulations
with the goal of improving the quality of publicly available financial
statements. Important milestones include 1992 when the Chinese Minis-
try of Finance (CMOF) promulgated the Accounting Standards for
Enterprises No. 1 – Basic Standards. In 1998, listed A-share firms were
required to adopt the Accounting System for Joint Stock Limited Enter-
prises issued by CMOF. In 2001, another set of new accounting stan-
dards that are more convergent with international ones were issued.
Finally, in February 2006, CMOF officially announced the introduction
of 39 new Chinese Accounting Standards which are substantially in con-
formance with IFRS. All listed firms were required to follow the 2006
new accounting standards effective in January 2007.
Prior to the 2006 reform, Chinese accounting standards were highly
prescriptive and largely rules based. A key change to the accounting
regime in China after the reform is the widespread use of fair value as
a measurement attribute. According to Peng and Bewley (2010), 25 of
38 new standards require or allow companies to use fair value account-
ing (FVA) for initial or subsequent measurement of assets and
liabilities, asset impairment testing, or disclosure in financial reports.
The 2006 reform also produced a set of new Chinese Auditing
Standards that are similar to international auditing standards issued by
the International Auditing and Assurance Board. In addition, on June
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28, 2008, the CMOF, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
the National Audit Office, China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC), and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) jointly
announced the adoption of Basic Standard for Enterprise Internal Con-
trols (C-SOX). C-SOX requires that companies listed on either the
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges conduct systematic evaluations
of their internal controls, report on an annual basis, and hire qualified
auditors to review the effectiveness of their internal control systems.
2.4. Hypotheses
Our first hypothesis examines whether IFRS adoption affects the extent
to which Chinese firms use accrual-based manipulation to manage earn-
ings upward. As discussed earlier, there are arguments suggesting either
a positive or negative relationship. On one hand, the adoption of IFRS
makes Chinese accounting standards more principles based. To the
extent that managers may perceive principles-based standards more diffi-
cult to circumvent because more emphasis is placed on the substance
rather than the form of the underlying transactions, the extent of oppor-
tunistic earnings manipulation by choosing accounting methods/esti-
mates (i.e., accrual-based manipulation) could be lessened after IFRS
adoption. In addition, the strengthened audit regulation and reforms in
other institutional frameworks such as the requirement of internal con-
trols evaluations could also reduce managers’ abilities to engage in
accrual-based earnings management in the post-IFRS period.
On the other hand, one major criticism of IFRS is its heavy reliance
on judgment when applying accounting standards, particularly for fair
value measurement. Increased subjectivity on accounting estimates
could create more opportunities to engage in upward accrual-based
earnings manipulation. Consistent with this notion, He et al. (2012)
argue and find that “the lack of active markets for non-financial assets
and the prevalence of related-party transactions provide firms with
opportunities to employ FVA for earnings management” in China.
Given the competing arguments and mixed empirical evidence dis-
cussed above, we formulate the first hypothesis in non-directional
form, which is stated as follows:
H1: There is a change in the extent of accrual-based earnings management
for Chinese firms after the mandatory adoption of substantially IFRS-con-
vergent accounting standards.
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Our second hypothesis considers the impact of China’s IFRS adop-
tion on another form of earnings management: real activities-based
manipulation. This kind of manipulation represents a departure from
optimal business practice; however, it is not a violation of GAAP. It is
unlikely to be subject to auditors’ scrutiny or on the radar of an audit
committee either.
As indicated earlier, prior research points to a substitutive relation
between real and accrual-based earnings management. In our context,
the substitution effect is likely to occur for Chinese firms after the 2007
IFRS adoption. On one hand, as we discussed under H1, IFRS adoption
could curb managers’ ability to use discretionary accruals to manage
earnings upward because (1) the more principles-based accounting stan-
dards reduce the opportunistic interpretation of complex rules and force
firms to better comply with the intent of the standards and/or (2) the
heightened outside scrutiny resulting from the audit reform and other
regulations increases the cost of doing accrual-based management. IFRS
reporting, however, does not directly affect firms’ ability to engage in
real earnings management. If managers trade off one mechanism for
another, they are likely to trade off upward accrual-based earnings man-
agement in favor of real activities manipulation in the post-IFRS period.
On the other hand, if increased reporting discretion allowed by an
IFRS framework creates more opportunities for Chinese managers to
engage in accrual-based manipulation, then we may find that Chinese
firms are less likely to use real activities to achieve their earnings tar-
gets. In either scenario, the substitution effect may occur and we could
observe a change in the extent of real earnings management after IFRS
adoption. Therefore, our second hypothesis, stated in non-directional
form, is as follows:
H2: There is a change in the extent of activities-based earnings manage-
ment for Chinese firms after the mandatory adoption of substantially
IFRS-convergent accounting standards.
3. Research Design
3.1. Measurement of Accrual-Based Earnings Management
To test H1, we use both the incidence and magnitude of discretionary
accruals as indicators of upward earnings management. To estimate
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discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones (1991) model
described in Dechow et al. (1995).
ACCRit
TAit1
¼ a0 1
TAit1
 
þ a1 DREVit  DRECit
TAit1
 
þ a2 PPEit
TAit1
 
þ eit ð1Þ
where ACCRit = total accruals for firm i in year t. It is defined as
earnings before extraordinary items (Global Compustat IBC) minus
the operating cash flows adjusted for extraordinary items and discon-
tinued operations (Global Compustat OANCF minus XIDOC); TAit–1
= total assets for firm i in year t–1 (Global Compustat AT); DREVit =
change in revenue for firm i in year t (Global Compustat SALE);
DRECit = change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t (Global
Compustat RECT); and PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment
for firm i in year t (Global Compustat PPEGT).
The above model is estimated cross sectionally for each firm-year
for each industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) with at least 10
observations. Applying the parameter estimates to the actual values
for each firm-year yields an estimate of total accruals. The difference
between actual total accruals and this estimate proxies for the discre-
tionary accruals (AB_DA). AB_DA indicates the magnitude of discre-
tionary accruals. We also assign a value of one to the dichotomous
variable, POSI_DA, for firm-years with positive AB_DA, to indicate
the incidence of upward accrual-based earnings management.
POSI_DA is assigned a value of zero otherwise.
3.2. Measurement of Real Earnings Management
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we use a firm’s abnormal levels of
cash flows, production costs, and discretionary expenditures as proxies
for real earnings management. Specifically, we model the normal level of
cash flows, production costs, and discretionary expenditures as follows:
CFOit
TAit1
¼ a0 1
TAit1
þ a1 SALEit
TAit1
þ a2 DSALEit
TAit1
þ eit ð2Þ
PRODit
TAit1
¼ a0 1
TAit1
þ a1 SALEit
TAit1
þ a2 DSALEit
TAit1
þ a3 DSALEit1
TAit1
þ eit
ð3Þ
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DISXit
TAit1
¼ a0 1
TAit1
þ a1 SALEit1
TAit1
þ eit ð4Þ
where CFOit = cash flows from operating activities adjusted for
extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i in year t
(Global Compustat OANCF minus XIDOC); TAit–1 = total assets for
firm i in year t–1 (Global Compustat AT); SALEit = total sales reve-
nue for firm i in year t (Global Compustat SALE); DSALEit = change
in sales revenue for firm i in year t; and PRODit = production costs
for firm i in year t. It is defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Glo-
bal Compustat COGS) and the change in inventories (Global Compu-
stat INVT); DISXit = discretionary expenditures for firm i in year t,
defined as the sum of advertising expenses (Global Compustat XAD),
R&D expenses (Global Compustat XRD), and SG&A expenses (Glo-
bal Compustat XSGA).
For each firm-year, we estimate the cross-sectional regressions of
models (2) through (4) for each 2-digit SIC code and require that at
least ten firms in a particular industry for model estimation. The
abnormal CFO, abnormal PROD, and abnormal DISX are computed
as the difference between the actual values and the normal levels esti-
mated from models (2) through (4).
The three variables discussed above measure various aspects of real
activities manipulation. When a firm’s actual cash flows from opera-
tions are lower than the normal level predicted from equation (2), the
abnormal CFO is negative, suggesting that the firm has engaged in real
earnings management by accelerating sales through price discounts.
Similarly, when the abnormal DISX is negative, it is an indication of
earnings manipulation by reducing discretionary spending such as
advertising, R&D expenses, and SG&A expenses. Finally, if the firm’s
actual production costs are greater than the normal level predicted
from equation (3), then the abnormal PROD is positive, which sug-
gests that the firm has managed earnings by reporting lower cost of
goods sold through increased production.
We create three continuous variables, AB_CFO, AB_PROD, and
AB_DISX, to measure the magnitude of abnormal operating cash
flows, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expen-
ditures, respectively. To have consistent signs across different mea-
sures so that a higher value of each measure indicates a greater
magnitude of real earnings management, we first multiply abnormal
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CFO and abnormal DISX by negative one. In other words,
AB_CFO = (–1)*abnormal CFO and AB_DISX = (–1)*abnormal
DISX. AB_PROD is defined as abnormal PROD. We also use an
aggregate measure, AB_REM, to capture total effects of real earn-
ings management. AB_REM is defined as AB_CFO + AB_PROD +
AB_DISX.
Similar to the analysis of accrual-based earnings management, we
create indicator variables to measure the incidence of real earnings
management. Specifically, we assign a value of one to POSI_CFO if
the firm’s abnormal operating cash flows are negative and zero other-
wise. POSI_PROD has a value of one if the firm’s abnormal produc-
tion costs are positive, POSI_DISX has a value of one if the firm’s
abnormal discretionary expenditures are negative, and POSI_REM has
a value of one if AB_REM is positive.
3.3. Empirical Models Examining H1 and H2
The following two regression models are used to test H1:
Pro(POSI DA)it ¼a0 þ a1POSTit þ a2MRK SHRit1 þ a3TOP10it
þ a4TENUREit þ a5NOAit1 þ a6ROAit
þ a7ASSETSit þ a8MTBit þ a9LEVit
þ a10kINDUSTRYk þ eit ð5Þ
AB DAit ¼b0 þ b1POSTit þ b2MRK SHRit1 þ b3TOP10it
þ b4TENUREit þ b5NOAit1 þ b6ROAit þ b7ASSETSit
þ b8MTBit þ b9LEVit þ b10kINDUSTRYk þ eit ð6Þ
where POSTit = indicator variable with the value of one if the observa-
tion is for the post-IFRS period (i.e., 2007–2011) and zero otherwise
(i.e., 2002–2006); MRK_SHRit–1 = ratio of a company’s sales (Global
Compustat SALE) to the total sales of its industry; TOP10it = indica-
tor variable with the value of one if the firm’s auditor is a Top 10
auditor based on total assets audited and zero otherwise; and TEN-
UREit = the number of years an auditor is retained by the firm (calcu-
lated from Global Compustat AU). NOAit–1 = net operating assets
(shareholder’s equity less cash and marketable securities plus total
debt) at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales (Global
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Compustat (CEQ-CHE+LT)/SALE); ROAit = income before extraordi-
nary items (Global Compustat IB) divided by lagged total assets (Glo-
bal Compustat AT); ASSETSit = industry-adjusted log value of total
assets (Global Compustat AT); MTBit = market-to-book ratio (Global
Compustat PRCCD*CSHOC/CEQ); and LEVit = leverage ratio, calcu-
lated as short-term debt (Global Compustat DLC) plus long-term debt
(Global Compustat DLTT) scaled by total assets (Global Compustat
AT) in year t. INDUSTRYk = an industry indicator variable which
equals 1 if the firm belongs to industry k. The subscript k equals 1,
2. . .or k-1, where k represents the number of unique industries based
on the Compustat two-digit industry classification.
The primary variable of interest in the above regressions is POST.
Given that H1 is a non-directional hypothesis, we do not predict the
sign on the coefficients on POST (i.e., a1 and b1). Several control vari-
ables are included. First, we use market share (MRK_SHR) to control
for firms’ leadership position in the market. Zang (2012) argues that
“managers in market-leader firms may perceive real activities manipu-
lation as less costly because the erosion to their competitive advantage
is relatively small” (p. 680). Second, we include auditor tenure because
it has been used as a proxy for audit quality/auditor scrutiny. Prior
research (e.g., Myers et al., 2003) finds that auditor tenure is negatively
related to the degree of accrual-based earnings management. Zang
(2012) further finds that auditor tenure is positively associated with the
extent of real earnings management. Third, we consider auditor size as
another control variable as prior literature documents that the extent
of accrual-based earnings management is lower for firm with large
auditors (e.g., Francis et al., 1999). Instead of using Big 4 membership
to classify auditors in China, we follow Wang et al. (2008) to identify
Top 10 auditors in China using the information published by the
CSRC. A dummy variable, TOP10, is created with the value of one if
the firm is audited by a Top 10 auditor and zero otherwise. Fourth,
we follow Barton and Simko (2002) to use net operating assets relative
to sales (NOA) as a proxy for firms’ accounting flexibility because it
reflects the optimistic bias in the prior periods’ accounting choices.
Zang (2012) finds that firms with higher NOA tend to engage in less
(more) accrual-based (real) earnings management.
In addition, we include ROA to control for firm performance,
ASSETS to control for firms’ relative size in the industry, MTB to
control for firms’ growth potential, and LEV to control for firms’ capi-
tal structure. These variables have been identified in prior research
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(e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) to be related to manage-
rial incentives to engage in earnings management. Finally, we include
industry dummy variables (INDUSTRY) to control for industry
effects.
To test H2, we employ the following two regression models:
ProðPOSI REMÞit ¼ c0 þ c1POSTit þ c2MRK SHRit1 þ c3TOP 10it
þ c4TENUREit þ c5NOAit1 þ c6ROAit
þ c7ASSETSit þ c8MTBit þ c9LEVit
þ c10kINDUSTRYk þ eit ð7Þ
AB REMit ¼ d0 þ d1POSTit þ d2MRK SHRit1 þ d3TOP10it
þ d4TENUREit þ d5NOAit1 þ d6ROAit þ d7ASSETSit
þ d8MTBit þ d9LEVit þ d10kINDUSTRYk
þ eit ð8Þ
If IFRS adoption decreases accrual-based earnings management and
if the substitution effect occurs, then we would expect that real earnings
management increases with the IFRS adoption. In other words, the
coefficients on POST for regression models (7) and (8) would be positive.
On the other hand, if IFRS adoption increases accrual-based earnings
management and if the substitution effect occurs, then the coefficients on
POST for regression models (7) and (8) would be negative.
4. Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of all Chinese A-share firms in Global Compustat
for the period 2002–2011. The pre-IFRS period is from 2002 to 2006
and the post-IFRS period is from 2007 to 2011. We exclude firms in
regulated industries, that is, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utili-
ties (SIC 4900-4999). Next, we exclude observations with non-positive
total assets and book values because ROA for these firms cannot be
interpreted in economic terms. We also require each firm-year obser-
vation to have necessary data to calculate all dependent and indepen-
dent variables. Finally, to minimize the confounding influence that
can arise when using a sample of observations pertaining to different
firms, we restrict our sample to firm-years with complete data for
both the pre- and post-adoption periods. Our final sample includes
4,050 firm-years (597 unique firms) spanning the ten-year period,
2002–2011. Panel A of Table 1 provides a summary of the sample
selection process.
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Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of sample observations
by year. It also presents the proportion of positive AB_DA and posi-
tive AB_REM by year and across both reporting periods. As shown,
for the entire sample period, about 49 (37) per cent of firm-year obser-
vations are associated with a positive AB_DA (AB_REM), an indica-
tion of using accrual-based (real) earnings management. Nearly 54 per
cent of firm-years report positive AB_DA for the pre-adoption period
(2002–2006) and the percentage declines to 47.05 per cent for the post-
adoption period (2007–2011). Regarding the real earnings management
behavior, we find 35 per cent of firm-years report positive AB_REM
Table 1. Sample Description
Panel A: Sample selection
No. of
firm-years
No. of
firms
Initial sample in the COMPUSTAT
from 2002 to 2011
12,205 2,184
Excluding firm fiscal years:
Financial services (SIC 6000-6999)
and utilities (SIC 4900-4999)
(556) (75)
Non-positive total assets and book value (291) (15)
With insufficient data to calculate
accrual and real earnings
management proxies
(4,697) (700)
With insufficient data to present
in both pre- and post-period
(2,611) (797)
Final sample 4,050 597
Panel B: Distribution of firm-year observations
Year
Firm-year
Obs.
No. of
positive
AB_DA
% of
positive
AB_DA
No. of
positive
AB_REM
% of
positive
AB_REM
2002 62 34 54.84% 19 30.65%
2003 107 53 49.53% 41 38.32%
2004 178 86 48.31% 61 34.27%
2005 396 209 52.78% 133 33.59%
2006 559 320 57.25% 202 36.14%
2007 506 261 51.58% 201 39.72%
2008 558 278 49.82% 225 40.32%
2009 554 273 49.28% 187 33.75%
2010 571 239 41.86% 209 36.60%
2011 559 242 43.29% 220 39.36%
2002–2006 1,302 702 53.92% 456 35.02%
2007–2011 2,748 1,293 47.05% 1,042 37.92%
Overall 4,050 1,995 49.26% 1,498 36.99%
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for the pre-adoption period and the percentage increases to 37.92 per
cent for the post-adoption period. Thus, the initial evidence is
consistent with the substitution effect occurring after China’s IFRS
adoption.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the test variables used in
regressions (5) through (8). The mean value of discretionary accruals
(AB_DA) is –0.003, and the mean value of the aggregate real earnings
management measure (AB_REM) is –0.056. Mean POSI_DA indicates
that 49.3 per cent of firm-years report positive discretionary accruals,
and mean POSI_REM indicates that upward real earnings manage-
ment occurs in 37 per cent of all firm-year observations. The mean
value of POST is 0.679, indicating that there are more firm-year obser-
vations in the post-adoption period. This is not surprising given the
increasing coverage of Chinese firms in Global Compustat in recent
years.
With respect to control variables, Table 2 shows that about 46 per
cent of firm-year observations are audited by a Top 10 auditor. In
addition, the mean market share (MRK_SHR) is 0.031, the mean
auditor tenure (TENURE) is 5.752 years, and the mean value of a
firm’s accounting flexibility (NOA) is 0.879. Finally, the average firm
has a logarithm industry-adjusted total assets (ASSETS) of 0.467 and
is associated with return on assets ratio (ROA) of 0.042, market-to-
book ratio (MTB) of 3.886, and leverage ratio (LEV) of 0.232.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75%
POSI_DA 4,050 0.493 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
AB_DA 4,050 0.003 0.061 0.046 0.001 0.043
POSI_REM 4,050 0.370 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
AB_REM 4,050 0.056 0.204 0.151 0.047 0.050
POST 4,050 0.679 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000
Control Variable
MRK_SHR 4,050 0.031 0.046 0.004 0.012 0.038
TOP10 4,050 0.459 0.050 0.000 0.000 1.000
TENURE 4,050 5.752 2.641 4.000 6.000 8.000
NOA 4,050 0.879 0.445 0.426 0.653 0.780
ROA 4,050 0.042 0.067 0.010 0.033 0.068
ASSETS 4,050 0.467 0.963 0.181 0.431 1.075
MTB 4,050 3.886 3.323 1.860 2.889 4.639
LEV 4,050 0.232 0.161 0.095 0.225 0.355
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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5. Results
5.1. Baseline Results
Table 3 presents the results of the pooled multivariate regressions (5)
and (6) that examine the accrual-based hypothesis (i.e., H1). To
mitigate the influence of potential outliers, we winsorize all continuous
variables at their respective 1st and 99th percentiles. The results
reported are based on the Huber–White heteroskedastic robust
statistics.
As shown in column (3), the coefficient on POST is negative and
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the listed A-share firms in
China are less likely to report positive discretionary accruals in the
Table 3. Results for Testing H1
Variable
(1)
Predicted
Sign (2)
POSI_DA
AB_DA
Coefficient
(3)
Marginal
Effects (4)
Coefficient
(5)
POST ? 0.236*** 0.059 0.005**
(2.831) (2.298)
MRK_SHR – 1.869** 0.467 0.031
(1.991) (1.242)
TOP10 – 0.075 0.019 0.004**
(1.097) (2.316)
TENURE – 0.035** 0.009 0.001**
(2.477) (2.286)
NOA – 0.086 0.021 0.002
(1.550) (1.220)
ROA ? 7.277*** 0.181 0.291***
(11.914) (17.210)
ASSETS ? 0.081* 0.02 0.004***
(1.809) (3.028)
MTB ? 0.017 0.004 0.001***
(1.453) (3.671)
LEV ? 1.220*** 0.304 0.055***
(4.993) (8.026)
Intercept 0.405* 0.003
(1.952) (0.518)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 4,050 4,050
Pseudo-R2 (R2) 0.041 0.095
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
The z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are computed using standard errors cor-
rected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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post-IFRS period. We also report marginal effects to measure the
economic significance of the explanatory variables. As shown in
column (4), the marginal effect on POST is -0.059, which suggests
that the probability of reporting positive discretionary accruals for
Chinese firms decreases by 5.9% after the adoption of substantially
IFRS-conformed accounting standards. For the regression testing
whether the magnitude of discretionary accruals declines post-IFRS,
the result in column (5) also indicates a significantly negative coeffi-
cient on POST. This result provides reinforcing evidence that the
extent of accrual-based earnings management is lessened after IFRS
adoption.
Table 3 also shows several significant control variables. Under
column (3), the coefficients on MRK_SHR, TENURE, and ASSETS
are significantly negative, indicating that the likelihood of engaging in
upward accrual-based earnings management is lower for firms with (1)
higher market share (MRK_SHR), (2) longer auditor tenure (TEN-
URE), and (3) larger size (ASSETS). In addition, the likelihood is
significantly and positively associated with firm performance (ROA)
and capital structure (LEV). Column (5) further indicates that the
magnitude of accrual-based earnings management is significantly and
negatively related to auditor size (TOP10), auditor tenure (TENURE),
firm size (ASSETS), and growth potential (MTB). However, its rela-
tionship with firm performance (ROA) and capital structure (LEV) is
significantly positive.
Table 4 shows the results of the pooled multivariate regressions (7)
and (8) for testing H2. Based on the aggregate measures, columns (3)
and (4) indicate that Chinese firms are more likely to engage in
upward real earnings management in the post-IFRS period. Specifi-
cally, the probability increases by 9.3%. Column (5) shows a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient on POST, indicating that the magnitude of
upward real earnings management has increased post-IFRS. Together
with the results reported in Table 3, our evidence suggests that the
trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings management occurs
in the post-IFRS period.2
Regarding control variables, Table 4 shows that both the likelihood
and magnitude of real earnings management are higher for firms with
(1) higher market share, and (2) higher leverage ratio, but lower for
firms with (1) better firm performance, (2) larger size, and (3) higher
growth potential3 .
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5.2. Additional Analyses
5.2.1. Cross-Sectional Subsample Analysis. Ownership Structure—One
distinctive feature of Chinese stock market is the dominance of SOEs.
In 2008, SOEs accounted for 65 per cent of listed firms and 89 per cent
of market capitalization in China. As pointed by prior studies (e.g.,
Piotroski and Wong, 2011; He et al., 2012), such ownership structure
could affect managers’ reporting incentives. For example, the govern-
ment support (e.g., favorable bank loans and tax treatments as well as
direct subsidies) received by SOEs reduce their reliance on external
capital, which could reduce their incentives to be more transparent in
the financial reporting process. In addition, the prevalence of related-
party transactions as well as the use of political connections and social
Table 4. Results for Testing H2
Variable
(1)
Predicted
Sign (2)
POSI_REM
AB_REM
Coefficient
(3)
Marginal
Effects (4)
Coefficient
(5)
POST ? 0.406*** 0.093 0.033***
(4.552) (4.499)
MRK_SHR + 2.763*** 0.634 0.352***
(2.824) (4.426)
TOP10 + 0.083 0.019 0.005
(1.154) (0.877)
TENURE + 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.037) (0.021)
NOA + 0.100* 0.023 0.006
(1.732) (1.302)
ROA ? 7.911*** 0.181 1.028***
(10.460) (14.606)
ASSETS ? 0.321*** 0.074 0.028***
(6.700) (6.810)
MTB ? 0.022* 0.005 0.005***
(1.856) (4.035)
LEV ? 0.522** 0.120 0.090***
(2.023) (3.921)
Intercept 0.477** 0.050**
(2.171) (2.047)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 4,050 4,050
Pseudo-R2 (R2) 0.075 0.175
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
The z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are computed using standard errors cor-
rected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
*, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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networks to conduct business transactions would reduce SOEs’ incen-
tives to supply accounting information to outside investors.
To the extent that SOEs and non-SOEs have different reporting
incentives, we in this section examine whether the effect of IFRS adop-
tion on earnings management behavior is conditional on a firm’s own-
ership structure. In particular, we partition sample firms into three
groups: non-SOEs (1,302 observations), central SOEs (755 observa-
tions), and local SOEs (1,993 observations). The results are summa-
rized in panels A.1 and A.2 in Table 5.
As reported in panel A.1, non-SOEs are less likely to engage in
accrual-based earnings management in the post-IFRS period. In addi-
tion, the magnitude of discretionary accruals declines after IFRS adop-
tion. For both central and local SOEs, however, the coefficients on
POSI_DA and AB_DA are not significantly different from zero, sug-
gesting that IFRS adoption has no significant impact on managers’
tendency to use accrual-based manipulation to increase earnings. Thus,
the reduction in accrual-based earnings management observed for the
overall sample appears to be largely confined to the non-SOE setting
where these firms likely have higher incentives for better financial
reporting than their SOE counterparts because they receive less gov-
ernment support and rely more on external capital. Consistent with
prior studies (e.g., Ball, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Daske et al.,
2008), these results underscore the importance of firms’ reporting
incentives to assess the effectiveness of IFRS adoption on financial
reporting quality.
Panel A.2 of Table 5 shows the results of testing H2 for SOEs and
non-SOEs. The coefficients on POSI_REM and AB_REM for non-SOEs
are positive but not significant at the conventional level. On the con-
trary, both central and local SOEs are significantly associated with an
increase in both the likelihood and magnitude of using activities-based
earnings manipulation. Thus, the unintended consequences of IFRS
adoption documented for the overall sample primarily pertain to SOEs.
Listing Status—Since 1998, Chinese regulators have implemented a
mechanism that changes the listing status of an underperforming firm
to the “special treatment” (ST) category if the firm reports losses for
two consecutive years. All ST firms are under more vigorous supervi-
sion and control. For example, the rise and fall range of an ST firm’s
share price per trading day is to be limited to five per cent instead of
ten per cent for a normal listed firm. In addition, if a ST firm
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continues to have losses for the third year, then it will be labeled as
“particular transfer” (PT), and it can only be traded on Fridays with
its share prices having a five per cent upper limit but no lower limit.
As indicated in prior studies (e.g., Jian and Wong, 2010; He et al.,
2012), such delisting mechanism has created strong incentives for Chi-
nese firms with poor financial performance to engage in earnings man-
agement to avoid being delisted. Thus, in this section we examine
whether the overall result is conditional on a firm’s listing status. We
divide the entire sample into two groups: firms that report losses for
two consecutive years (i.e., firms that are subject to ST status) and
firms without such delisting concerns. The results are summarized in
panels B.1 and B.2 of Table 5.
As seen in panel B.1, firms without delisting concerns are associated
with a lower likelihood and smaller magnitude of upward accrual-
based earnings manipulation after IFRS adoption. Such effects,
however, do not appear to occur for firms with delisting concerns. The
evidence is consistent with the argument that firms that sustain losses
for two consecutive years and therefore will receive a ST status have
stronger incentives to manage earnings upward to avoid being delisted.
Therefore, the effectiveness of IFRS reporting in reducing accrual-
based earnings management for ST firms is quite limited.
Turning to panel B.2 of Table 5, we find both ST and non-ST firms
are associated with higher degrees of upward real earnings manage-
ment (in terms of both probability and magnitude), suggesting that the
unintended consequences of IFRS adoption occur regardless of a
firm’s listing status.
Regional Differences—Prior research shows that the level of market
and institutional development varies across different regions in China.
The regional differences affect earnings quality and auditor choices.
For example, Wang et al. (2008) find that in regions where institutions
are less developed, SOEs (for both central and local SOEs) have a
stronger tendency than non-SOEs to hire small local auditors, but this
tendency is significantly reduced in regions with more developed insti-
tutions. Lee et al. (2013) indicate that firms in less developed regions
of China are associated with a greater increase in financial reporting
quality in the post-IFRS period.
Following the aforementioned prior studies, we examine whether
the change in earnings management behavior varies across different
regions in China, depending on the level of market and institutional
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development. We first partition sample firms into two groups using the
index scores developed by Fan et al. (2006): high versus low market-
ization firms.4 A firm is classified as a high (low) marketization firm if
it is located in a province with the market development index score
being above (below) the median of the sample.5 As a second way to
examine a firm’s regional development status, we partition sample
firms into three different regions using the classification scheme
adopted by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC): eastern,
central, and western regions.6 The results are summarized in panels
C.1 and C.2 of Table 5.
As reported in panel C.1, the high marketization firms are less likely
to engage in accrual-based earnings management in the post-IFRS per-
iod. In addition, the magnitude of discretionary accruals declines after
IFRS adoption. For the low marketization firms, however, the coeffi-
cients on POST for both POSI_DA and AB_DA are not significantly
different from zero, suggesting that IFRS adoption has no significant
impact on the likelihood and magnitude of using accrual-based manip-
ulation to increase earnings. Thus, the effect of IFRS adoption on the
reduction in accrual-based earnings manipulation appears to be stron-
ger for the high marketization firms, which is consistent with the argu-
ment that firms in regions with higher degrees of market and
institutional development are likely to have stronger incentives to
improve accounting quality This is also in line with the notion that, in
the case of emerging markets, the degree of similarity of economic and
social environments to developed countries could affect the effective-
ness and relevance of IFRS adoption (e.g., Tyrrall et al., 2007; Liu
et al., 2011).
Panel C.2 of Table 5 shows the results of testing H2. For both high
and low marketization firms, the coefficients on POST for both
POSI_REM and AB_REM are significantly positive at the 5 per cent
or better level, suggesting that the unintended consequences of IFRS
adoption occur for both types of firms.
The results reported in panels D.1 and D.2 provide a consistent pic-
ture. As shown, firms located in the more developed eastern coastal
regions are associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood
and magnitude of accrual-based earnings management. For the firms
located in the less developed inland regions (i.e., central and western
regions), however, the coefficients on POST for both POSI_DA and
AB_DA are not significantly different from zero. In terms of real
earnings management, in panel D.2 we find significantly positive
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coefficients on POST across three different regions, suggesting that the
unintended consequences of IFRS adoption occur regardless of the
firm’s regional development status.
Industry Membership—China has been growing manufacturing output
enormously for the past 30 years, overtaking the U.S.A. as the world’s
top manufacturing nation in 2010. Given its unique importance in Chi-
na’s economy7 , we in this section examine whether the effects of IFRS
adoption on earnings management behavior differs between manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing sectors. Using the industry classification
of Global Compustat, we partition the sample observations into manu-
facturing (3,044 observations) and non-manufacturing (1,006 observa-
tions) groups. As expected, the manufacturing sector dominates the
entire sample. Results are reported in panels E.1 and E.2 of Table 5.
As shown in panel E.1, the coefficient on POST for the regression
with POSI_DA as the dependent variable is significantly negative at the
1 per cent (10 per cent) for non-manufacturing (manufacturing) firms,
indicating that both types of firms are less likely to report positive dis-
cretionary accruals. For the regression with AB_DA as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on POST is significantly negative at the 1 per
cent level for the non-manufacturing group. The coefficient for the man-
ufacturing group is also negative; however, it is not significant at the
conventional level. Overall, the evidence suggests that the reduction of
accrual-based earnings management is less pronounced for manufactur-
ing firms possibly because the greater competition among firms in the
manufacturing sector increases earnings management incentives of such
firms and therefore the benefit of IFRS adoption is smaller.
Turning to panel E.2 of Table 5, we find that, for both likelihood
and magnitude tests, the coefficient on POST is significantly positive at
the 1 per cent level for both groups. This result indicates that both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms are more likely to engage
in upward real earnings management in the post-IFRS period. In addi-
tion, the magnitude of upward real earnings management also
increases after IFRS adoption.
In a further analysis (not tabulated due to brevity), we find that,
within the manufacturing sector, high-tech firms are associated with a
significant decline in both the likelihood and magnitude of accrual-
based earnings management.8 Such decline, however, does not occur
for non-high-tech manufacturing firms. To the extent that high-tech
firms might face greater growth potential and rely more on external
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capital, this result is consistent with the view that high-tech firms have
stronger incentives to improve accounting quality and therefore the
benefit of IFRS on curbing accrual-based earnings management is
more pronounced for such firms. In addition, we find no significant
evidence that high-tech manufacturing firms are associated with an
increase in real earnings management after IFRS adoption. On the
other hand, for non-high-tech manufacturing firms, there is a signifi-
cant increase in real earnings management in the post-IFRS period.
5.2.2. Analysis of Capital Market Effects. While our earlier results docu-
ment a change in earnings management behavior for Chinese firms in the
post-IFRS period, in this section we intend to provide evidence on
whether the adoption can produce direct capital market effects. Two sets
of questions are addressed. First, Does IFRS adoption affect firm valua-
tion? Second, Does IFRS reporting improve the market perception of
the usefulness of accounting numbers? The details are provided below.
Does IFRS adoption affect firm value of Chinese firms?—It has been
argued that IFRS reporting would be associated with positive capital
market effects because, with higher quality reporting and better disclo-
sure, IFRS can increase market liquidity and reduce cost of capital,
which in turn will improve firm valuation (e.g., Daske et al., 2008).
Consistent with this argument, prior research has documented increas-
ing market liquidity (Daske et al., 2008), decreasing bid-ask spread
(Muller et al., 2011), lower cost of equity capital (Li, 2010) and public
debt (Florou and Kosi, 2011), and higher equity valuation (Daske
et al., 2008). Prior evidence, however, also indicates that many of
those positive effects are confined to countries/settings where a strong
regulatory framework and/or enforcement mechanism is placed. Given
that China has been typically argued to be associated with weaker
legal institutions and limited reporting incentives, it would be an open
empirical question whether the adoption of IFRS in China can
improve firm valuation.
Following Daske et al. (2008), we use Tobin’s Q as a measure of
firm value and perform the following regression analysis:
Tobin0sQit ¼A0 þA1POSTit þA2SIZEit þA3ASSETS GROWTHit
þA4INDUSTRY Qit þA5LEVit þ eit ð9Þ
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where Tobin’s Q = (total assets – book value of equity + market value
of equity)/total assets; SIZE = industry-adjusted log value of total
assets; ASSETS GROWTH = (total assets in year t - total assets in
year t–1)/total assets in year t–1; INDUSTRY Q = yearly median To-
bin’s Q in a given 2-digit SIC code industry; and LEV = leverage ratio,
calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt scaled by total
assets.
In Table 6, we report the Tobin’s Q results for the overall sample
where we find the coefficient on POST is significantly positive at the 1
per cent level, indicating that Chinese firms exhibit a significant
increase in firm value after IFRS adoption. For the cross-sectional
tests, the results show that the coefficient on POST is significantly posi-
tive for all subsamples except for the firms in the less developed wes-
tern region9. Overall, our evidence appears to suggest that China’s
2007 IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in firm value. The
increase could be attributed to the higher quality reporting and the
more comprehensive disclosure requirements associated with IFRS
adoption and/or concurrent changes in the governance regimes that
support the introduction of IFRS.
Table 6. Capital Market Effects—Firm Valuation (Tobin’s Q)
Variable
(1)
Predicted
Sign (2)
Coefficient
(3)
POST ? 0.190***
(5.118)
ASSETS ? 0.414***
(19.086)
ASSETS GROWTH ? 0.000
(0.472)
INDUSTRY Q ? 1.014***
(26.048)
LEV ? 1.320***
(11.730)
Intercept 0.671***
(9.504)
No. of observations 4,050
R2 0.351
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
The z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are computed using standard errors cor-
rected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Does IFRS reporting improve the market perception of the usefulness of
accounting numbers?—Value relevance of earnings versus book value of
equity—Using the framework developed by Ohlson (1995) and Fel-
tham and Ohlson (1995), we first use the relative value relevance of
earnings and book value of equity as a measure of the market percep-
tion of the usefulness of accounting numbers. We perform the follow-
ing regression analysis to investigate whether earnings and book value
of equity have become more useful to investors for firm valuation since
China’s adoption of IFRS in 2007.
Pit ¼ B0 þ B1BVEit þ B2EPSit þ B3POSTþ B4BVEit  POSTit
þ B5EPSit  POSTit þ eit ð10Þ
where Pit is price per share for firm i three months after fiscal year-
end t, EPSit is net income per share of firm i during the year t, and
BVEit is book value of equity per share of firm i at the end of year t.
POST = 0 for the pre-IFRS period (2002–2006) and POST = 1 for the
post-IFRS period (2007–2011). B1 and B2 are valuation coefficients for
book value of equity and earnings in the pre-IFRS period, and B4 and
B5 capture their incremental effects in the post-IFRS period. If both
accounting earnings and book value of equity become more important
in the valuation of Chinese firms after IFRS adoption, then both B4
and B5 would be significantly positive.
The results for the overall sample are reported in panel A of
Table 7. As shown, the estimated incremental valuation coefficient on
earnings in the post-IFRS period (i.e., EPS*POST) is 5.536, which is
significantly positive at the 1 per cent level. The estimated incremental
valuation coefficient on book value of equity for the post-IFRS period
(i.e., BVE*POST) is also positive, but it is only marginally significant
at the 11 per cent level. These results suggest that investors place more
weight on the earnings information for Chinese A-share firms after
IFRS adoption. There is also weak evidence that book value of equity
becomes more value relevant in the post-IFRS era.
Results for various subsamples (not tabulated due to brevity) show
that the sign on EPS*POST is significantly positive for all subsamples
except for firms with delisting concerns and firms that are located in
the central region. The coefficient on BVE*POST is insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero for most of subsamples except for central SOEs, firms
without delisting concerns, high marketization firms, and firms that
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are located in eastern and central regions, where the sign of the coeffi-
cient is significantly positive.10
Value Relevance of Earnings versus Cash Flows from Operations—We
also compare the relative value relevance of earnings and cash flows
before versus after IFRS adoption. Barth et al. (1999) provide empiri-
cal evidence that accruals and cash flows each have significant incre-
mental explanatory power in equity valuation. Cheng et al. (1996)
argue and find that the relative value relevance of cash flows from
Table 7. Capital Market Effects—Value Relevance
Variable
(1)
Predicted
sign (2)
Coefficient
(3)
Panel A: Value Relevance of Earnings versus Book Values
BVE + 0.748***
(3.649)
EPS + 8.029***
(13.367)
POST ? 3.782***
(18.550)
BVE*POST ? 0.883
(1.629)
EPS*POST ? 5.536***
(3.323)
Intercept 1.909***
(3.192)
No. of observations 3,619
R2 0.255
Panel B: Value Relevance of Earnings versus Cash Flows
CASH + 2.125***
(2.977)
EPS + 8.189***
(13.583)
POST ? 4.294***
(17.397)
CASH*POST ? 1.538*
(1.794)
EPS*POST ? 5.994***
(3.889)
Intercept 3.077***
(9.205)
No. of observations 3,619
R2 0.291
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
The z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are computed using standard errors cor-
rected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
* and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
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operations improves as the transitory components of earnings increase.
Ho et al. (2001) show that cash flows become more value relevant
around the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The following regression analy-
sis is performed to assess the incremental explanatory power of earn-
ings versus cash flows.
Pit ¼F0 þ F1CASHit þ F2EPSit þ F3POSTþ F4CASHit  POSTit
þ F5EPSit  POSTit þ eit ð14Þ
where Pit is price per share for firm i three months after fiscal year-
end t, EPSit is net income per share of firm i during year t, and
CASHit is operating cash flows per share of firm i during year t. POST
has the value of one if the observation is in the post-IFRS period and
zero otherwise.
The results for the overall sample are reported in panel B of
Table 7, which show that the sign on EPS*POST is significantly posi-
tive at the 1 per cent level. The sign on CASH*POST is also positive
but with smaller magnitude and less significance level (at the 10 per
cent level). In addition, the sign on EPS*POST is significantly positive
for all subsamples except for firms with delisting concerns and firms
that are located in the central region. The sign on CASH*POST is sig-
nificantly positive for non-SOEs, firms without listing concerns, high
marketization firms, firms in the central region, and manufacturing
firms11 .
6. Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the prevalence of both accrual-based and
real earnings management activities for a set of Chinese firms sur-
rounding the adoption of substantially IFRS-convergent accounting
standards. Since 2007, all listed A-share firms in China have been
required to comply with a new set of accounting standards that have
substantially conformed to IFRS. As a set of principles-based account-
ing standards, IFRS intends to enhance the comparability of account-
ing information, increase corporate transparency, improve the quality
of financial reporting, and hence benefit investors. The new reform
also produced a set of new auditing standards and internal control
reporting requirements. To the extent that IFRS adoption may lead to
a change in the quality of accounting standards and the strength of
regulatory frameworks in China, we examine the association between
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IFRS adoption and earnings quality by focusing on the changes (if
any) in earnings management behavior (accrual- versus activities-based
manipulation) in the post-IFRS period.
We identify a sample of Chinese A-share firms that are listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period of 2002–2011.
The entire sample consists of 4,050 firm-year observations. Our evi-
dence for this entire sample indicates that Chinese firms in the post-
IFRS period (2007–2011) are associated with a lower likelihood of
reporting positive discretionary accruals. The magnitude of discretion-
ary accruals also declines after IFRS adoption. In response, we see
firms turning to real activities manipulation as a substitute for upward
earnings management.
A cross-sectional analysis, however, reveals that the benefits of
IFRS adoption in curbing upward accrual-based earnings manipula-
tion are not evenly distributed across firms. Specifically, the benefit
diminishes for firms that are controlled by Chinese central or local
governments, located in less developed regions, and with weak finan-
cial performance and therefore subject to delisting status. We also find
that the benefit is less pronounced for manufacturing firms than for
their non-manufacturing counterparts.
In the final set of empirical tests, we go beyond the earnings man-
agement issue and examine whether China’s IFRS adoption is associ-
ated with any positive or negative capital market effects. Our findings
show that Chinese A-share firms exhibit a significant increase in firm
value (in terms of Tobin’s Q) in the post-IFRS period. We also find
that the market perception of the usefulness of accounting numbers
has improved in the post-IFRS period. Specifically, investors appear to
place more weight on the earnings information in firm valuation in the
post-IFRS period. We have some evidence that book value of equity
and cash flows from operations become more value relevant; however,
the evidence is much weaker relative to that of earnings.
Notes
1. These factors include, for example, the strength of equity market and private sector
that affect the demand for high-quality accounting standards, the extent of government
involvement and institutional support in formulating and enforcing accounting stan-
dards, the effectiveness of audit regulation and other monitoring infrastructures, and in
the case of emerging markets, the degree of similarity of economic and social environ-
ments to developed countries.
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2. We also test H2 using the three individual measures. Regarding the abnormal cash
flows (POSI_CFO and AB_CFO), we find the coefficients on POST are significantly
positive at the 1% level, suggesting that the likelihood and magnitude of accelerating
sales through price discounts to increase earnings has increased in the post-IFRS per-
iod. For the abnormal production costs (POSI_PROD and AB_PROD), the coefficients
on POST are positive but not significant at the conventional level. Finally, the analysis
containing POSI_DISX and AB_DISX indicates that firms in the post-IFRS period are
more likely to engage in real earnings management by reducing discretionary expendi-
tures and that the magnitude of such manipulation also increases after IFRS adoption.
3. Following prior research (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012), we also use a
sample of earnings management suspect firms to create a potentially more powerful
test. This sample is limited to firm-year observations that just beat/meet important
earnings benchmarks. More specifically, we follow Zang (2012) and define “suspects”
as firm-year observations that either meet/slightly beat zero earnings benchmark (with
earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 0.005), meet/
slightly beat last-year earnings (with change in basic EPS excluding extraordinary items
from last year between 0 and 2 cents), or meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The
suspect-firm sample contains 1,271 firm-year observations for the 2002–2011 period.
The results for both H1 and H2 are similar to those of the overall sample.
4. This approach has been used by Wang et al. (2008) and He et al. (2012).
5. See table 1–2 of Fan et al. (2006) for the market development index.
6. According to NBSC, “eastern” includes the following provinces: Beijing, Fujian,
Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Hei-
longjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. “Central” includes Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi
and Shanxi, and “western” consists of Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner
Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Yunnan.
7. As the central pillar of China’s economy, the manufacturing sector produced 44.1
per cent of GDP in 2004 and supported 11.3 per cent of total employment in 2006. It
also accounted for nearly 89 per cent of China’s exports (Hanson and Robertson,
2008) and around 50 per cent of the market capitalization of China’s stock market
(Lee et al., 2013) over the period 2000 to 2005.
8. Following Francis and Schipper (1999), we classify firms as high-tech manufacturing
firms if their first three digits of the SIC codes are 283, 357, and 360–368.
9. The results are not tabulated due to brevity. They are available from the authors
upon request.
10. We also conduct a R2 decomposition analysis to assess the value relevance of earn-
ings and book value of equity. Specifically, we compare the R2 of the following regres-
sion models for both pre- and post-IFRS periods to assess whether the explanatory
power of earnings and book value of equity with respect to security prices has changed
surrounding IFRS adoption.
Pit¼C0þC1EPSitþC2BVEitþeit ð11Þ
Pit¼D0þD1EPSitþeit ð12Þ
Pit¼E0þE1BVEitþeit ð13Þ
The R2 of regression (11) measures the combined value relevance of earnings and book
value of equity. A comparison of the R2 for regressions (11) and (13) indicates the
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incremental value relevance of earnings over that of book value, and the comparison of
the R2 for regressions (11) and (12) indicates the incremental value relevance of book
value over that of earnings. The results show that, for the overall sample, the incremen-
tal explanatory power of earnings over that of book value increases from 3.2 to 17.5
per cent, while the incremental explanatory power of book value over that of earnings
is nearly identical (0.9 versus 0.1 per cent) for both periods. The subsample results are
also similar to those of the overall sample.
11. Details for the subsamples are not tabulated to conserve space. They are available
upon request.
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Appendix A
Variables in Regressions (5) through (8)
AB_DA A firm’s signed discretionary accruals calculated from modified
Jones model (1991)
AB_REM A firm’s signed real earnings management measure which equals
(-1)*abnormal_CFO + abnormal_PROD + (1)*abnormal_DISX
POSI_DA An indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm’s discretionary
accruals (AB_DA) are positive and 0 otherwise
POSI_REM An indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm’s AB_REM is
positive and 0 otherwise
POST An indicator variable with the value of one if the observation is for
the post-IFRS period (i.e., 2007–2011) and zero otherwise (i.e.,
2002–2006)
MRK_SHR Ratio of a company’s sales to the total sales of its industry (based
on two-digit SIC codes)
TOP10 An indicator variable which equals 1 if a firm is audited by a
Chinese Top 10 auditor and 0 otherwise.
TENURE Number of years an auditor is retained by the firm
NOA Net operating assets scaled by sales at the beginning of year
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets
ASSETS Industry-adjusted log value of total assets
MTB Market-to-book ratio
LEV Leverage ratio, calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt
scaled by total assets
INDUSTRYk An industry indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm belongs to
industry k. The subscript k equals 1, 2. . . or k1, where k
represents the number of unique industries based on two-digit
industry classification
Variables in Regressions (9) through (14)
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q measured as total market equity plus total assets and
minus common equity
POST An indicator variable with the value of one if the observation is
for the post-IFRS period (i.e., 2007–2011) and zero otherwise
(i.e., 2002–2006)
SIZE Industry-adjusted log value of total assets
ASSETS
GROWTH
Total assets in year t minus total assets in year t1 scaled by total
assets in year t1
INDUSTRY Q Industry year median Tobin’s Q
LEV Leverage ratio, calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt
scaled by total assets
RET Stock return calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the
stock price 3 months after fiscal year-end to the stock price 9
months before fiscal year-end, adjusted for dividends and stock
splits
P Stock price three months after fiscal year-end
EPS Net income per share
BVE Book value per share
CASH Cash flows from operations per share
Data Source: GLOBAL COMPUSTAT.
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